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RECENT CASES
son to maintain himself without such work, and regardless of his
ability to obtain such employment. The petitioner was arrested
for violating this statute. He now brings habeas corpus proceed-
ings on the ground that the sfatute is unconstitutional. Held,
petition granted. Ex parte Hudgins, 103 S. E. 327 (W. Va. 1920).
For a discussion of this case, see NOTES, p. 171.
DEAD BODIES--NATURE OF RIGHTS IN DEAD BoDIE.--This was an
action of trespass on the case for wantonly and willfully disinter-
ing the remains of the plaintiff's mother and son, exposing the
same to public gaze and removing them to another burial place
without the plaintiff's permission. The plaintiff alleges he suf-
fered mental anguish and great humiliation as a result of the de-
fendant's acts. Held, judgment for the plaintiff. England et al.
v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 104 S. E. 46 (W. Va. 1920).
Originally at common law no property rights were recognized
in a dead body. Regina v. Sharpe, 7 Cox 0. C. See 3 CoxE's IN-
STITUTE, 203; 2 BILACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS, 429. On burial it
became a part of the soil and the owner of the land would have a
right of action for trespass. The modern cases universally allow
recovery to certain persons for disinterment or mutilation of a
dead body. There are, however, many divergent theories as to the
basis of recovery. One is that it is founded on the next of kin's
right to possession. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307. Another is
the law recognizes property in a human corpse, but property
subject to a trust and limited in its rights. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
207 Pa. St. 313. The principal case and others rest recovery on
the ground that there is a quasi-property right in the next of kin.
It is not alone with reference to property that legal rights exist.
Koerber v. Patek, 102 N. W. 40. There is, as the law develops, a
tendency to protect more and more the intangible rights of pri-
vacy and personality both individual and group. See Pound,
"Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personal-
ity", 29 HARv. L. REv. 640. The greatest obstacle to allowing re-
covery for injury to such interests is that there is no external
voucher for the reality of the injury. Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88; Homans v. Boston Co., 180
Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737. It is submitted that the true ground in
the principal case for giving recovery is that the mutilation or re-
moving from its resting place of a dead body, without permission
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of the next of kin, is an insult to the family right to have its dead
rest inviolate. The voucher for the reality of the injury may be
found in the mutilation or disturbing of the dead body. Since the
injury is in its essence an injury to the family honor or dignity,
it would follow that the recovery must depend upon the degree of
the relationship. -W. F. B.
JOINT WRONGDOERs-DISTINCTION BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS
AND CONTRIBUTORS TO INJURY.-The defendant was one of several
independent upper riparian owners, refuse from whose mines de-
stroyed the value of plaintiff's property in such a way that it was
very difficult to prove how much of the damage was done by each.
Held, the independent owners are not jointly liable, nor is ony one
of them liable for such damages in their entirety. Farley v. Crys-
tal Coal & Coke Co., 102 S. E. 265 (W. Va. 1920).
The decision in the principal case is supported by the great
weight of authority in this country. Pulaski Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Gibboney Sand Bar Co., 110 Va. 444, 66 S. E. 73; Little Scityl-
kill Navigation, Railroad & Coal Co. v. Richard's Admr., 57 Pa.
St. 142. The decisions generally rest on the theory that the wrong
done, upon which the right of action arises, is throwing refuse into
the stream. This is in every sense a separate wrong, and torts
originally several cannot be made joint because their consequences
afterwards become blended and united with each other. Little
Schuylkill Navigation, Railroad & Coal Co. v. Richard's
Admr., supra; Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co. et aZ., 111
Tenn. 430, 78 S. W. 93. The chief obstacle in such cases is the prac-
tical impossibility of assessing damages with any degree of certain-
ty, In a similar case the Ohio court held that the jury could not
reach their verdict by ascertaining the amount of the whole dam-
age, and dividing it by the number contributing thereto. Upson
Coal & Mining Co. v. Willianis, 75 Oh. St. 644, 80 N. E. 1134, 22
L. R. A. N. S. 283n. Most courts hold that the relative proportion
of refuse thrown in by each may form some guide, and that a jury
in case of such difficulty caused by the defendant himself, should
measure the injury with a liberal hand. Little Schuylkill Naviga-
tion, Railroad & Coal Co. v. French, 813 Pa. St. 366; Swain v.
Tennessee Copper Co., supra. The court in the latter case inti-
mates that in such cases the court would be slow to interfere with
damages supposed to be excessive. Such a method of assessing
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